INDOCHINA

I. Transportation

A. Overland and inland water routes from China

1. Railroads

What is the maximum capacity for two-way traffic; maximum permissable axle loading; maximum gross and net train tonnage on segments of line limiting through capacity; estimated tonnages presently moving by railroad; transshipment facilities at transfer points; new construction and repair activities; status of dismantled rail segments on the lines:

a. Kunming-Mengtze-Laokay-Yen Bay?

b. Nanning-Pingsiang-Langson-Hanoi?

c. Status of reported railroad, Nanning-Liu Chow Peninsula

Precise details of the conditions limiting loads on these lines are not known, nor is there sufficient information to assess the tonnages presently moving.

As regards new construction and repair, the line from Pisechai to Laokay is apparently not being restored, the Hanoi Langson railway is inoperative and portions of the roadbed are being used as a highway, and the Nanning-Pingsiang line is reportedly being extended to Chennankuan. No details are available on the progress of construction on the Nanning-Liu-Chow peninsula railway.

2. Inland Waterways

What is the upper limitation of navigation for shallow draft vessels -- at low water? at high water? What is the present number and tonnage of vessels, mechanically powered and other, operating on these rivers? Are craft available to increase this traffic? If so, to what extent?

a. The Red River is navigable up to Laokay at high water by vessels drawing 7 feet. Beyond this point, numerous rapids obstruct navigation and the maximum draft is reduced to 2 feet.

b. The Clear River, which forms the Red River from the North at Viet Tri, can be navigated up to Tuyen Quang, a distance of 62 miles, by vessels drawing about 2 feet. During the high water season this draft is increased to 5 feet; above Tuyen Quang, sampans can then navigate an additional 95 miles.

c. Upper reaches of Lost River, which flows into China. A tributary of the Lost River, the Yu River, flows through Caobang in Indochina. From Caobang downstream, this river is navigable by shallow draft native craft.

d. Ong Doc River (Trans Bassac). According to available sources, this river is approximately 5 feet deep and 60 feet wide as far as Ca Mau and its merger with the Cai Tau River near Khanh An. Through its junction with various connecting canals, it furnishes access to a large portion of the Trans-Bassac region, and by the canal from Quan Lo to Phung Hiep (8 feet deep and 130 feet wide) at Ca Mau it is connected with the Bassac River. The exact route of the upper river is now confused by the connections with the network of canals in the area. To the northwest, a connection at Tan Loi links with the Canhgia River, which in turn is connected by a canal route to the Bay of Rach Gia (minimum depth 5 feet, width 60 feet). To the South, the Ong Doc is connected by several river systems, including the Bay Hap, Cua Lou, Duong Keo, Ganh Hao, and My Thanh rivers and the canal from Ca Mau to Bac Lieu (5 feet deep, 60 feet wide). All the figures given are for low water, and are dated 1945. High water figures are not available. This region is presently held by the Viet Minh.

There is no information regarding the numbers or sizes of craft available on the above rivers, but numerous small vessels are used in these areas.

3. Other routes capable of handling wheeled traffic and those main routes limited to human and animal lift (particularly the following: Hanoi-Laokay; Hanoi-Langson-Dongdang-Caobang; Sept Pagodes-Moncay; Hanoi-Langson-Nanning.)

a. New repair and construction activities

Information concerning repair and construction activities of these routes is not available.

b. Estimated tonnages presently moving over those routes and maximum capacity.

Estimated maximum tonnages that could be moved over the principal routes from China into Indochina are as follows:

The eastern group of roads:

Caobang-Hanoi	
Langson-Hanoi	
Moncay-Hanoi	1500 short tons/day

The western group of roads:

Laokay-Hanoi	
Hagiang-Hanoi	450 short tons/day

An estimate of tonnages presently moving over these routes is not available.

D. Overseas Routes from China

What are the principal sea routes utilized by the Chinese Communists to ferry supplies from Hainan Island and South China to the Viet Minh-controlled areas of Vietnam? Estimated tonnages presently moving via these routes? Estimated maximum capacity via these routes?

Several overseas routes have been used for ferrying supplies from China to Viet Minh-controlled areas. However, all have diminished in importance due

to improved land supply routes between China and the Viet Minh territories. The air and naval blockade imposed by the French along the coast of Indochina has also increased the relative danger of the sea routes. It is believed that practically all of the material reaching Viet Minh forces from China is now shipped by land routes.

The principal sea routes are:

1. From Hong Kong, Macao, or Communist Chinese ports to Thailand by legitimate shipping and thence from Thai ports clandestinely by small craft along the coast to the nearest point on the coast of Cambodia; thence along to the inland waterways of Cochin China to final destinations. This route is not now believed to carry any considerable traffic due to the restrictions of the Thai government as well as to the blockading efforts of the French and the Associated States.

2. From the Canton area to the Tonkin Delta region, with possible relays at such points as Fort Bayard and Pei-hai (Pak-hoi). From Tung-hsing (Tung-hing) cargoes are moved in short night stages close to the coast. French air reconnaissance tends to restrict the size of the vessels engaged in the traffic along the Indochinese coast to small craft easily hidden or beached and camouflaged during the da time. The coast route also probably involves goods carried via land routes in China to Pak-hoi, Tung-hsing and Moncay and then transshipped along the coast by the Viet Minh in small craft. This route probably would be most suited to the supply of small Viet Minh units operating along the waterways of the lower Tonkin Delta.

3. From the Canton area to the Tonkin and Annam coasts, via Hainan and Wei-Chou Island, by motorized sea-going junks or fast vedettes

across the Gulf of Tonkin. Yulin is the most frequently mentioned of the Hainan ports.

4. From the Tonkin area to Southern Viet Minh-held areas: - Some material arriving both by the aforementioned routes and by inland routes is carried by combinations of coastal sea routes and inland routes in stages along the coast of Annam. French naval and air surveillance largely restricts the use of these routes to short night hauls.

5. From Canton to Hainan to Paracel Islands to Central Annam coast is one route by which some small amount of traffic may occur.

No estimate is available of the tonnages moving along the various sea routes. A variety of types of small craft engage in the traffic, but French naval and air surveillance greatly restricts its volume. Any estimate of the capacity of these routes would have to take into consideration the effectiveness of the blockade imposed against it as well as the relative advantages attached to its use. So long as the Viet Minh are able to transport most of the traffic from China by less dangerous land routes they are unlikely to risk losing a considerable percentage of the goods carried on hazardous sea routes. Should the French succeed in interrupting a portion of the traffic handled by the presently-developed land routes, increased traffic at sea could probably be expected.

C. **Airfields**

1. **What is the present state of Franco-Vietnamese and Viet Minh airfields? What are the lengths and load bearing capacities of these airfields? What are the fuel storage facilities and what is the extent of fuel stockpiling? What are the maintenance and repair facilities?**

a. **Franco-Vietnamese Airfields** --

Name	Class *	Coordinates	Users	Description
Ban Me Thuot A/F	5	12-40N 108-03E	FAF	4,425 ft. natural surface runway, weight-bearing, 26,000 lbs; drum fuel storage.
Battambang A/F	5	13-06N 103-15E	FAF and Civil Airlines	Good 3,930 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47.
Bien Hoa A/F	4	10-57N 106-49E	FAF	5,000 ft. temporary runway, weight bearing, light bombers; taxiways; parking aprons; hangars; major repairs; drum fuel storage.
Cap St Jacques A/F	5	10-22N 107-05E	FAF and Civil Airlines	3,930 ft. temporary runway, weight bearing, 26,000 lbs.; taxiways.
Fin an(Dalat/Lien Khang) A/F	4	11-45N 108-23E	FAF and French Civil Airlines	4,870 ft. permanent runway, weight bearing, C-47; taxiway, parking apron; limited radio; limited drum storage.
Dong Hoi A/F	5	17-30N 106-35E	FAF and Civil Airlines	Good 3,000 ft. temporary runway, 8,000 lb. weight-bearing capacity.
Do Son A/F	5	20-43N 106-47E	FAF	3,640 ft. new permanent runway, weight-bearing, light transport; taxiways; parking apron; 4 fuel tanks of 20,000 gal. capacity each
Haiphong/Cat Bai A/F	3	20-49N 106-43E	FAF and Civil Airlines	5,700 ft. good, permanent runway being extended to 7,896 ft. weight-bearing, C-54 and jet fighters; radio and limited lighting; hangar; 1,608,000 gal. fuel tank storage, largest a/f storage in Indochina; minor repairs.
Haiphong/Kienan A/F	4	20-49N 106-38E	FAF	New airfield; 5,900 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 60,000 lbs.; taxiways; revetments; parking apron.
Hanoi/Bac Mai A/F	4	21-00N 105-50E	FAF and French Civil Airlines	3,940 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-47; taxiways; parking aprons; hangars; limited radio; drum fuel storage; repair facilities.

* **Class 1**

Permanent runways 7,000 feet or more in length able to sustain medium bomber operations.

Class 2

Permanent runways 6,000 feet or more in length able to sustain limited medium bomber operations.

Class 3

Runways 5,000 feet or more in length potentially able to sustain medium-bomber operations.

Class 4

Runways 4,000 feet or more in length which can be used by light transports and conventional fighters.

Class 5

Runways 2,000 feet or more in length; airfield operational or potentially important.

e. Franco-Vietnamese Airfields -- (cont'd)

Name	Class	Coordinates	Users	Description
Hanoi/Gia Lam A/F	4	21-03N 105-53E	FAF, French, and U. S. Civil Airlines	4,220 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-54; taxiway; radio; lighting; drum fuel storage; minor repairs; hangars.
Hue A/F	4	16-24N 107-41E	FAF and Civil Airlines	4,260 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47; radio facilities; limited drum fuel storage; hangar.
Kompong Chhnang A/F	4	12-14N 104-39E	FAF	5,425 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-54 in dry season parking apron.
Krakor A/F	4	12-32N 104-07E	FAF	5,800 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, 90,000 lbs. in dry weather; taxiways.
Luang Prabang A/F	5	19-53N 102-08E	FAF	3,120 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, C-47 in dry weather.
Nha Trang A/F	3	12-14N 109-11E	FAF and French Civil Airlines	2 permanent runways, 5,920 ft. and 3,810 ft. long, with 40,000 lb. weight-bearing capacity; taxiways; parking apron; radio; limited lighting; POL in underground tanks major FAF repair.
Oudong A/F	5	11-52N 104-42E	FAF	5,900 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-54; taxiway; emergency field.
Pakse A/F	4	15-08N 105-47E	FAF (limited use)	4,000 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-54; limited radio; minor repair.
Phan Thiet A/F	5	10-54N 108-04E	FAF	3,280 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47.
Phnom Penh A/F	3	11-33N 104-51E	FAF and French Civil Airlines	2 permanent runways, 5,300 ft. and 3,080 ft. long, with weight-bearing capacities of 60,000 lbs. and 30,000 lbs., respectively; taxiways; parking aprons; radio, limited lighting; POL; one of best fields in Indochina.
Savannakhet A/F	5	16-40N 105-00E	FAF and French Civil Airlines	Two 3,930 ft. permanent runways, weight-bearing, C-47; taxiways; parking aprons; limited radio; POL available.
Siem Reap A/F	4	13-25N 103-49E	Limited FAF and Civil Airlines	5,460 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, C-47.
Soc Trang A/F	5	9-35N 105-57E	Civil Airlines and limited FAF	Good 3,930 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-47; limited drum fuel storage.

a. Franco-Vietnamese Airfields -- (cont'd)

Name	Class	Coordinates	Users	Description
Tan Son Nhut A/F	3	10-48N 106-39E	FAF, domestic, and foreign airlines	2 permanent runways, 5,300 ft. and 5,250 ft. long, with 93,000 lb. weight-bearing capacity; taxiways; parking apron, radio and lighting; 12 hangars; 28,000 gal. of fuel in surface tanks; 5 underground tanks; 5,000 gal. oil storage; 500,000 gal. fuel storage in Saigon; major repairs; best and most important field in Indochina.
Tchepone A/F	5	16-43N 106-11E	FAF	2 temporary runways, 4,090 ft. and 3,300 ft. long, with 23,000 lb. weight-bearing capacity.
Thu dau Mot A/F	4	10-59N 106-42E	FAF (emergency use only)	5,240 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 60,000 lbs.
Tourane A/F	3	16-02N 108-12E	FAF and Civil Airlines	3 permanent runways, 6,820 ft., 5,900 ft., and 2,340 ft. long, each with 80,000 lbs. weight-bearing capacity; taxiway; parking area; limited radio and lighting; tank and drum fuel storage; drum oil storage; hangar, minor repairs: best airfield in central Indochina.
Vientiane A/F	5	17-58N 102-33E	FAF	2 excellent temporary runways, 3,670 ft. and 2,850 ft. long, with C-54 weight-bearing capacity in dry season; taxiways; radio; limited fuel and oil drum storage; hangar; minor repair.

b. Viet Minh Airfields --

Name	Class	Coordinates	Controlled By	Description
Bac Kan A/F	5	22-08N 105-50E	Viet Minh	2,700 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, light aircraft.
Cao Bang A/F	5	22-41N 106-14E	Viet Minh	2,400 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, 23,000 lbs.
Ha Giang A/F	5	22-52N 104-56E	Viet Minh	2,600 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, light aircraft.
Lang Son A/F	5	21-50N 106-46E	Viet Minh	3,600 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, C-47; presently cratered.
Lao Kay A/F	5	22-29N 103-58E	Viet Minh	2,880 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing, C-47.
Thai Nguyen A/F	5	21-37N 105-50E	Viet Minh	2,690 ft. natural-surface runway.
That Ke A/F	5	22-14N 106-29E	Viet Minh	2,400 ft. natural-surface runway, weight-bearing capacity, 23,000 lbs.
Tong A/F	4	21-07N 105-28E	Viet Minh	4,160 ft. laterite runway; taxiways, parking areas.
Vinh A/F	5	18-44N 105-40E	Viet Minh	5,100 ft. laterite runway; partially destroyed; taxiways, revetments.

2. **What is the present state of Chinese Communist airfields within operational distance of the Tonkin Delta? What are the lengths and load bearing capacities of these airfields? What are the fuel storage facilities and what is the extent of fuel stockpiling? What are the maintenance and repair facilities?**

Name	Class	Coordinates	Users	Description
Chan-i A/F	4	25-38N 103-47E	CCAF (Chinese Communist Air Force)	5,900 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, B-24, taxiways parking aprons; fuel-storage; limited radio; hangars.
Cheng-kung A/F	2	24-51N 102-48E	Former B-29 field; not currently in use.	8,530 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, B-29; taxiways parking aprons.
Chan-hsien A/F (Yan-chow)	4	21-57N 106-36E	CCAF	4,500 ft. temporary runway, weight-bearing, conventional-fighter aircraft, underground gasoline pumps reported along Tung River opposite airfield.
Erh-tang A/F	3	25-18N 110-10E	CCAF	6,560 ft. permanent runway, easily rehabilitated for use by jet-fighter aircraft; parking aprons; limited radio; drum fuel storage.
Kun-ming A/F	2	25-00N 102-45E	CCAF and Civil Air-lines	Two 7,200 ft. permanent runways, weight-bearing, B-29 and jet-fighter aircraft; taxiway, parking aprons; radio and lighting, 9 fuel storage tanks; hangars, repair facilities.
Li-chia-tsun A/F	3	25-11N 110-19E	Not used since World War II	8,530 ft. temporary runway; parking aprons, taxiways.
Lu-liang A/F	2	25-00N 103-38E	Former B-29 field, not currently in use.	11,200 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 160,000 lbs.; two 5,240 ft. permanent runways; can support fighter aircraft; taxiways parking aprons; could easily be rehabilitated for medium-bomber operations.
Liu-Chou A/F	2	24-17N 109-23E	CCAF	7,540 ft. permanent runway; weight-bearing, C-54; taxiways; parking aprons; limited radio; hangars. Easily rehabilited for use by jet-aircraft.
Lo-ping A/F	3	24-52N 104-21E	In use by C-54 transports during World War II. Not currently in use.	7,300 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-54; taxiways; parking aprons.

Name	Class	Coordinates	Users	Description
Meng-tzu A/F	4	23-20N 103-25E	CCAF	5,240 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-47; taxiways; parking aprons; hangars; drum fuel storage; radio and limited lighting.
Nan-ning A/F	2	22-49N 108-21E	Not believed currently in use	6,000 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, 75,000 lbs.; taxiway; parking aprons; construction reported; but never confirmed.
Pai-se A/F	4	23-53N 106-39E	CCAF	5,000 ft. permanent runway; weight-bearing capacity, C-46; taxiways; parking apron; underground fuel tanks and open drum storage; minor repair facilities.
San-ya A/F (Hainan Island)	4	18-17N 109-26E	Not in use.	Two permanent runways, 4,600 ft. and 3,400 ft. long, weight-bearing, C-54; taxiways; parking aprons; hangars.
Tan-chu-hsu A/F (Tanchu)	3	23-29N 110-32E	CCAF	6,560 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-46; taxiways.
Wu-ming A/F	5	23-11N 108-15E	CCAF	3,900 ft. permanent runway; fuel storage facilities.
Yang-tang A/F	3	25-12N 110-10E	CCAF	6,560 ft. permanent runway, weight-bearing, C-47; limited radio, parking aprons.
Fo-lo A/F (Hainan Island)	4	18-30N 108-48E	Not in use	Two permanent runways, 4,920 ft. and 3,930 ft. in length; weight-bearing, C-47; taxiways; parking apron.
Ch'iung-shan A/F (Haikou)	4	20-03N 110-20E	CCAF	Two 4,900 ft. permanent runways, weight-bearing, C-46; taxiway; parking aprons; hangars; limited radio; drum fuel storage; minor repair.

D. Shipping

1. What are the berthing, lighterage, anchorage, and repair facilities for the following ports: Saigon, Tourane, Hue, Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Haiphong, Hongai, Cuangyen, Vinh, and others of importance? For the principle ports on Hainan? For the principal Chinese ports from Liu Chow Peninsula to the Indo-china border?

(a) SAIGON:

The following is the berthage capacity at Saigon:

Alongside Cargo Berths	= 8 Liberty, 4000', 31-18' draft
	2 C1-M, 790', 31-18' draft
	Lighterage, 2600', 16-9' draft
Fixed Mooring Berths	= 12 Liberty
Tanker Berths	= 1 450', 25' draft
	5 250', 13' draft
Naval Berths	= 1 390' DD
	1 312' SS
	6 221' AM
	4 98' AMC
	1 80' PT

Estimated military port capacity: 7,500 long tons of general cargo per 24-hour day.

There are about 220 lighters, 1,600 junks, and barges with a total of 100,000 tons capacity. Cargo to be discharged is usually transferred from vessels berthed alongside the wharves, but cargo to be loaded (especially rubber and rice) is usually transferred from barges to ocean-going vessels moored in the midstream berths.

There is no anchorage available except at the entrance to the port, near Cap St. Jacques. Repairs of all types can be performed. There are two graving docks and two floating drydocks, but drydock facilities are limited to vessels of the size of an LST.

Machine shops and foundries are available at the Naval Arsenal. There are four marine railways. Divers and diving gear, including deep sea equipment, are available. There are no salvage tugs.

(b) TOURANE:

The Public Works wharf has a useable length of 140 meters (June 1952). An additional 103 meters of reinforced concrete are now under construction and are scheduled for completion in October 1952.

Tanker berths: 1 small tanker, 1 tanker barge.

There are two mooring buoys in the Tourane River.

Cargo is discharged to lighters at the anchorage.

The following harbor craft are maintained at the port: four tugs, six barges of 150 ton capacity each, four barges of 50-ton capacity each, and 20 wooden lighters of unknown capacity.

Estimated military port capacity: 850 long tons per 24-hour day.

Vessels of light or moderate draft may anchor about 400 yards south-eastward of Observatory Island, in about 3½ fathoms, mud, or mud and shells, with protection from all winds. Vessels of deep draft should anchor westward of the point on which Observatory Light is located, in depths of 6 to 8 fathoms, which is a more exposed position during the northeast monsoon.

Some repairs can be effected at the railroad workshops and at the shops of the automobile transport company.

(c) HUE:

There are no lighters nor alongside berthing facilities except for small craft.

There is good anchorage about 1¼ miles 16 degrees from North Fort, in a depth of about 10 fathoms, sand, but it is very insecure during the northeast monsoon.

There are no repair facilities at Hue.

(d) PHNOM PENH:

Vessels usually berth at the wharves, although cargo is occasionally handled by lighters at the anchorage. The principal wharves available for overseas vessels are: one concrete jetty (railroad wharf) of about 275' of

berthing space; three floating landing stages 125'-195' long; additional provisional landing stages which can be set up on short notice; and two private jetties capable of handling small coastal tankers.

There are two wharf cranes and four mobile cranes having a capacity of 1½-5 tons. There are no floating cranes.

The port has three tugs, the largest of which is 150 horsepower. There are five lighters available; two of 150 ton capacity, one of 50 ton capacity, and two of 25 ton capacity.

Whereas vessels are customarily berthed at the port, anchorage is permitted in the Tonle Sap River, within the limits of the port.

Only minor repairs, such as the repair of electrical equipment, can be performed. There is a small machine shop but there are no foundries, heavy-duty cranes, drydocks, marine railways, diving equipment, or salvage tugs.

(e) HANOI:

Hanoi has 2,790' of wharfage. Coastal vessels moor to buoys in the stream; four such berths are available.

Numerous sampans and junks are available for lighterage.

Small vessels can anchor south of Hon Sup, a small island, in 3-3/4 fathoms. The anchorage area within the port is to the southward of Doumer bridge in 3 fathoms.

There are no repair facilities in the port.

(f) HAIPHONG:

The main wharf, with a depth of 10'-22' alongside, has berths for two C1-M 350' long and a 2,100' lighter wharfage. There is one tanker barge berth and one 350' DD berth. The present condition of the wharves is good.

The mooring buoys in the river at Haiphong provide 7 berths, 4 for C1-M and 3 for coastal-type vessels.

Several tugs and a large number of lighters with capacities up to 100 tons are available.

Ordinary repairs to hull and machinery can be effected. There are available 6 small graving docks, the largest of which can accommodate an LST.

(g) HONGAI:

There are three coal loading berths, a coal lighter wharf, and a jetty for small ships in the port. The three coal berths have 16 to 21 feet alongside.

There are several coal lighters at Hongai.

Vessels can take anchorage southward of the entrance to Port Courbet.

Two mooring buoys are laid in Port Courbet.

There is a workshop at Hongai with forges, foundries, and fitting shops, and the repairing of ships is undertaken.

(h) QUANGYEN:

Loading and unloading is accomplished by lighters only. Anchorage is available, but there are no repair facilities.

(i) VINH:

Benthui, located 10 miles up the Song Ka, is the port of Vinh.

There are four wharves with high-water depths of 6½ feet to 10 feet alongside. At low water vessels will ground on the mud.

There is no information on lighters.

Good anchorage in a depth of 4½ fathoms may be obtained abreast of the tide gauge at Benthui. Vessels drawing 9 feet can anchor about 110 yards off the wharves.

The railroad shops can perform repairs. It is reported that a shipyard for the construction of wooden ships is located here.

(j) BANGOI:

A pier with a T-head extends 1,300 yards southward from Koncon, a point close eastward of Bangoi. There is a depth of 17'-21' at its extremity. A fixed mooring for one small coaster is available.

There are no lighters at Bangoi, except for junks and sampans.

There is no difficulty in entering, and vessels can anchor anywhere in the harbor, according to draft. The best place is on the eastern side,

northward of the entrance, off the small piers. The holding ground is good, but a position should not be taken too near the shore as the locality is subject to on-shore squalls.

There are no repair facilities at this port.

(k) CAM PHA PORT:

The coal wharf is 984 feet long and has a least depth of 26 feet alongside. There is also a lighter wharf 530 feet long with berthage facilities for five lighters, but it dries up at low water. A fixed mooring for 1 small coaster-type vessel is available.

There are no lighters at Cam Pha Port. Lighters are brought, as needed, from Haiphong.

Good anchorage in depths of 3¼ to 5½ fathoms may be taken in the northern part of the channel. The swinging room is limited to a radius of 165 yards.

There are minor repair facilities at this port.

(l) PEI-LI, HAINAN:

The wharves, which occupy most of the waterfront, provide 2,445 linear feet of berthing space consisting of a main mole (1,200 by 500 feet), two small piers (150 by 25 feet and 130 by 25 feet), and a construction mole (275 by 350 feet). The berthing facilities will accommodate five standard coasters and eight lighters with depths of from 6 to 8 feet alongside.

There are no free-swinging berths in the harbor. Anchorage for large vessels outside the harbor is fully exposed, but small craft can find shelter in the lee of Yu-lin-chou.

Numerous small craft are available in the harbor.

No data are available on repair facilities.

(m) YU-LIN-SAN-YA, HAINAN:

The wharf facilities provide 2,890 linear feet of berthing space of which 1,310 linear feet have depths from 26 to 30 feet, 1,250 linear feet have depths from 20 to 25 feet, and 330 linear feet have depths from 6 to 19 feet.

The berthing facilities will accommodate one Liberty-type vessel, two C1-M-AV1-type vessels, eleven lighters, and one tanker.

Anchorage facilities are apparently quite adequate in depths of at least 20 feet over good holding ground.

There is no information available on harbor craft.

Some small-boat repair work can be accomplished.

(n) PEI-HAI, CHINA:

The only Chinese port from Liu Chow Peninsula to Indochina for which there is any information is Pei-hai.

The harbor is 2½ nautical miles long and ½ nautical mile wide outside the 3-fathom curve; it is 18 to 27 feet deep. The entrance is open.

Anchorage is open to NE. There are ten Class III free-swinging berths. (Class III has a diameter of 300 yards and a 20 foot depth).

There are no wharves, piers, quays, or other landing facilities. Lighters and sampans land on a beach.

There is no other information available on this port.

2. What are the conditions of the channels and approaches to these ports and what navigational aids are now being maintained? What recent obstructions to navigation are known to exist?

On most of these ports information has been drawn from Hydrographic Office Publication No. 125, 1937, with 1950 supplement. For more detail on navigational aids at these ports see this publication.

(a) SAIGON:

The Saigon River is the channel used by ocean-going vessels bound for Saigon. Navigation of the river is restricted to vessels of such drafts as can be taken over the Coral Bank, an obstruction in the river about half-way between the entrance and Saigon, on which the least depth in the fairway is 23 feet. Coral Bank has been dredged to provide a channel 164 yards wide and 19½ feet deep on the range line in the shoalest section.

There are several wrecks in the channel which are marked by a green buoy and a white buoy.

In 1949, it was reported that the harbor had been practically cleared of wrecks.

There are beacons, buoys, and lights to mark the channel; a signal station is located at Nhabe, 9 miles below Saigon.

(b) TOURANE:

The entrance of Tourane Bay has depths of 10 to 12 fathoms, and the depths decrease gradually to the head of the bay, where the 5-fathom curve is about one mile from the shore.

Outside the 5-fathom curve is Canton Rock, which lies on the southeastern side of the entrance 650 yards from shore. The rock has two heads; one dies two feet and the other is covered with one foot of water. A black conical buoy marks the northeastern side of the rock, but is frequently carried away by the sea. A stranded wreck lies about ½ mile southeastward of Observatory Light. Another stranded wreck, which is marked by a black and white buoy, lies about 1-3/4 miles westward of the light. There is also one capsized vessel off Customs Pier (Appontement des Douanes). Depths of less than 3 fathoms extend one mile off the mouth of the Tourane River. The Tourane River is obstructed by a bar, above which, abreast the town of Tourane, there are depths of 12 to 24 feet. A channel, protected by a dike, has been dredged across the bar to a depth of 14 feet. The channel is marked by lighted beacons, and there are three unlighted beacons in the river above the bar. In 1947, it was reported that vessels drawing more than 11 feet should not attempt to enter the channel except when absolutely necessary, and then only during fine weather.

(c) HUE:

The Hue River discharges through a low shore 23 miles northwestward of Chonmay Bay. About 7 miles up the river is Hue. The river is suitable only for small craft. The best marks at Hue River are North Fort, upon which there is a flagstaff, and the beacons for leading over the bar.

There are no dangers in the approach, but the lead should be kept going.

The entrance is about 200 yards wide with a depth of about 7 feet and is fronted by a bar that extends about one mile seaward and has about the same depth. The controlling harbor depth is only 3 feet.

An obstruction has been placed at the entrance to Hue River, so that Thuanan Pass is now impracticable.

A native pilot can be obtained.

(d) PHNOM PENH:

The controlling depth during the low water stage is 5 meters at high tide. There are no special limitations.

A station at Cap St. Jacques communicates by international flags and flashing light. There are no signal stations which furnish information on subjects such as weather and traffic.

There is no other information on this port.

(e) HANOI:

The main channel to Hanoi leads through the Lach Dai, thence it follows the course of the Song Dai, the Canal de Phu Ly and the Song Ka to Hanoi. The entrance is fronted by a dangerous bar and drying sandbanks which extend 7 miles off shore. The seaward end of the channel through the banks lies 5 miles east and 1 mile south of Hon Ne, a small island which provides the best landmark for inward bound vessels. Depth on the bar is 9 feet at high water, but the channel deepens immediately inside the river. Vessels of 9 feet draft may navigate the channel at high water; at low tide they cannot proceed beyond Phu Ly.

There is no information on navigational aids or obstruction to navigation.

(f) HAIPHONG:

Since the silting up of the Cua Cam, vessels of moderate draft use the Cua Nam Trieu, and then passing through the Maritime Canal they enter the Cua Cam about 4 miles below Haiphong. The depth in the dredged channel across the bar is 18 feet, and the bottom is composed of fairly hard muddy sand. Under optimum conditions, using favorable tides, a ship drawing 23 feet can proceed to Haiphong and berth alongside.

Depths of 3 fathoms have been reported on and southward of the bar range in an area 5.7 to 7 miles from the front light. Depths of 1-3/4 fathoms are also located on the range about 2½ miles from the front light. Less water than charted has also been reported for about 1 mile above the junction of this range with the next channel range.

The dredging of the river and the channel across the bar is carried on only during the northeast monsoon. While the dredging is stopped the channel across the bar gradually fills to a minimum depth of about 18 feet at lowest low water. This is the lowest depth observed during the year and occurs in October.

In May 1949, a vessel drawing 18 feet 10 inches crossed the bar on a rising tide and observed a depth of 21 feet 4 inches. According to the Haiphong pilots a vessel drawing 19 feet 8 inches can always cross the bar on the next tide. Vessels frequently go in and out at night, as the channel is well lighted, except that lights of some buoys have been extinguished due to Viet Minh action.

Maritime Canal is an artificial cut through the middle of Dinh Vu Island. It is nearly 1 mile long and has a low-water depth of 18 feet. The navigable width of the canal is 300 feet.

In the harbor, the only obstruction is a wreck of a floating drydock lying awash east of Transit Wharf and clearly visible.

A light marks the position of a stranded wreck about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile westward of the front range light that leads up the first reach of the Kua Nam Trieu. An obstruction, over which there is a depth of $\frac{1}{4}$ fathom, lies on the north-eastern side of the channel over the bar about six miles southeastward of the front range light.

Pilotage is compulsory and necessary because of uncertain depths.

(g) HONGAI:

A dredged channel, marked by five red conical buoys, leads across Halong Bay from near Surprise Island to the deep-water area off Hongai.

Hamelin Channel is the deepest route to Hongai. The general depths are not less than 15 feet except in one area where the depth is 12 feet.

Lights are exhibited along Hamelin Channel. Beacons and buoys are also displayed in the area.

The channel through the bar southward of Chemal and Repos Islets in 1946 had a depth of 12 feet and a bottom of soft mud. At this depth a vessel drawing 19 feet could negotiate the channel at half tide and one drawing 26 feet at high water. These two channels are marked by buoys, and pilots are available.

(h) QUANGYEN:

Quangyen is a river port 9 miles above Haiphong. The controlling depth of the entrance is 7 feet and that of the harbor is 6 feet. No further information is available.

(i) VINH:

The entrance points of the Song Ka River, on which is located Benthui, are both low and sandy. On the northern one is a small fort, and on the southern one a pagoda.

The bar, which is composed of hard sand and subject to changes, extends over one mile seaward from the southern entrance point. In 1930 a channel with a width of 164 feet and a depth of 12 feet was dredged across the bar. This channel is marked by buoys, which are moved as changes occur. At high water the channel is available for vessels drawing 18 feet. A more recent report states that the entrance channel is dredged to 8¼ feet, but due to silting constant dredging is necessary.

The port is open to junks or to very small steamers.

Lights, buoys, tidal and storm signals are available at Benthui.

(j) BANGOI:

Camranh Bay, through which vessels pass to reach Bangoi, is one of the finest harbors on the coast of Anam. It is available to all classes of vessels and offers secure anchorage at all seasons. The bay is composed of an outer and inner harbor and is surrounded by mountains.

Grand Passage, the channel through the outer section of the bay, is nearly 1-3/4 miles wide between Tagne Island on the east and the small island of Hon Trung on the west. The passage has depths of 12 and 13 fathoms and is free of danger.

Camranh Harbor, the inner part of Camranh Bay, is 8 miles in length by about 2 miles in breadth. The deeper section of the harbor is about 3 miles long by 1½ miles wide, is free of shoals, and has depths of 6 to 8 fathoms.

The harbor is easy of access and affords good and landlocked anchorage over good holding ground of mud. Le Goulet, the entrance, is nearly 3/4 mile wide and has depths of 10 to 13 fathoms.

There are lights, buoys, and storm signals available.

(k) CAM PHA PORT:

Cam Pha Channel leads northward to Cam Pha Port. The least depth in the channel is 2-3/4 fathoms, and vessels drawing 26½ feet can enter the port.

There are beacons, buoys, and lights available in the channel and harbor.

Pilotage is compulsory.

(l) PEI-LI, HAINAN:

The approach to the harbor is through the open waters of Pei-li Chiang. The depths are about 24 feet near the harbor entrance. Landmarks are conspicuous. The harbor is entered past either end of the detached breakwater. The northeastern entrance is 240 yards wide and the southwestern entrance is 260 yards wide. Depths in either entrance are 21 feet.

(m) YU-LIN--SAN-YA, HAINAN:

The land-locked northern part of Yu-lin Chiang is separated from the southern part by a channel 120 yards wide and with a least depth of 28 feet. The entrance to the river estuary at San-ya Chiang is about 100 yards wide and has depths of about 19 feet.

Navigation aids are available; pilotage is not necessary.

Natural landmarks are not conspicuous.

3. What fuel oil stocks and fuel oil storage facilities are currently available in these ports?

Total petroleum storage capacity of Indochina amounts to 948,915 barrels, distributed as follows:

Port	Capacity in barrels
Saigon	733,832
Haiphong	166,239
Tourane	29,374*
Phnom Penh	17,500
Hanoi	1,970
Total	948,915

* At Tourane other tanks with a capacity of 37,740 barrels are under construction by the Shell Oil Company.

The petroleum storage capacity at Saigon is distributed as follows:

Product	Capacity in barrels
Avgas	27,123
Mogas	136,260
Kerosene	72,185
Gas oil	12,470
Diesel oil	178,083
Fuel oil	121,898
Miscellaneous	185,813
Total	733,832

Diesel oil is available at Phnom Penh, but no bunker C oil is available. There is no data on fuel oil stocks at any of the other ports in Indochina. There is also no data on fuel oil stocks or storage for Pei-li, Hainan or Pei-hai, China. At Yu-lin--San-ya, Hainan, a petroleum depot is known to have six storage tanks and something over 15,000 square feet of storage space. It is estimated that the storage tanks have a capacity of 45,000 barrels.

Information follows on Port Wallut, Ream, Qui Nhon, and My Tho, which are considered to be as important as, or more important than, the ports named in questions 1, 2 and 3.

(n) PORT WALLUT:

#1

a. Berthage

200 linear feet of lighter wharfage, at stone masonry quay, suitable for handling general cargo.

b. Lighters available - None

c. Anchorage and moorings

Protected anchorage NE and NW of harbor entrance for a total of 2 standard ocean-type vessels and 4 coasters, in good holding ground.

One mooring buoy for a small ocean-type vessel about 900 feet N of quay.

d. Estimated military port capacity - 200 long tons per day, all by lighterage.

e. Repair facilities - Two hauling-out ramps for small boats.

(o) REAM (10° 30' N, 103° 38' E)

#1

a. Berthage - Alongside cargo berths: 300 feet of lighter wharfage. Fixed mooring berths: None

b. Lighters available - None

c. Anchorage - 10 destroyer or coaster anchorages.

d. Estimated military port capacity - 100 long tons per day.

e. Repair facilities - None

#2 Harbor

a. Approaches - Southerly approach free and clear with depths over 30 feet to entrance, westerly approach more difficult due to islands and shoals but has depth in excess of 60 feet.

b. Channels - Main entrance from the south, width 2/3 of a mile, depth 21 ft; Western entrance 1½ miles width with depths of 28 feet. Depths shoal to 15 feet at the northern end of the harbor strait.

c. Navigational aids - Two metal pylons indicate axis of entrance channel. No other navigational aids exist in vicinity of port.

d. Harbor obstructions - None

e. Pilotage - It is thought that pilotage is not required at Ream. There is no information on availability of pilots.

#3 Petroleum - None

(p) QUI NHON (13° 40' N, 109° 15' E)

#1

a. Berthage - Alongside cargo berths: 600 lin. ft. of lighter wharfage. Fixed mooring berths: None

b. Lighters available - Several lighter and junks.

c. Anchorage - Berths for 9 coaster-type vessels.

d. Estimated military port capacity - 600 long tons per day.

e. Repair facilities - None

#2 The harbor which opens directly into the sea has no obstructions or restrictions in the approach. Is entered by a passage 600 feet wide and dredged to 16 feet. Depths in harbor fairway are from 72 to 18 feet. The harbor is well marked with lighted and unlighted aids and require periodic dredging.

#3 Petroleum storage - None

(q) MY THO (10° 21' N, 106° 21' E)

#1

a. Berthage - Alongside cargo berths: 1,400 feet of lighter wharfage. Fixed mooring berths: None

b. Lighters available - Undetermined but several barges and numerous native small craft are available.

c. Anchorage - None

d. Estimated military port capacity - 500 long tons per day.

e. Repair facilities - One 90 to 100 foot graving dock, limited minor repairs can be undertaken.

#2 Harbor

a. Approach - Approach to the Song Cua Tieu, the most northerly of the Mekong mouths is used. A bar 10 miles to seaward has least depth of 8 feet and ½ miles width. Inside the bar, depths are somewhat greater to My Tho. About 20 miles above the main approach the channel passes the Song Cua Dai, a distributary of the Mekong. The fairway from this point has a 10 ft least depth and 1,000 ft width, and extends 7 miles to My Tho where the river depth is 12 ft. off My Tho.

b. Navigational aids - The fairway is unmarked.

c. Harbor obstructions - One sunken sloop off the northern side of Cu Lao Rong is only artifical obstruction to navigation.

d. Pilotage - Pilotage is necessary but there are no data on number or competency of pilots.

II. Trade

A. What kind and quantity of supplies have been shipped to the Viet Minh by Communist China and by other Soviet Bloc nations? Which routes are used primarily? What are the economic capabilities of Communist China to supply Viet Minh?

A. Trade with the Communist Bloc

1. Imports from Communist China

Reports from a variety of sources which in most cases cannot be evaluated suggest that within the past year Communist China has sent the following supplies to the Viet Minh:

a. Arms and ammunition: Mountain guns; anti-aircraft guns; light machine guns; heavy machine guns; field guns; howitzers; mortars; rifles, including Browning automatic rifles; pistols; rocket launchers; spare parts; ammunition; TNT and other explosives; fuzes; detonators; projectiles; grenades and grenade throwers; and land mines.

b. Commissary:

(a) Food: Rice; maize; dried sweet potatoes; cereals; and soy beans, flour.

(b) Clothing: Uniforms; cotton material; army blankets; cloth shoes; rubber shoes; steel helmets.

c. Transportation and communication equipment: Trucks; tires; spare parts; gasoline; oil; kerosene; radio sets and field transmitters.

d. Other: Medical and clinical supplies; X-ray metal testing equipment; balances; electric meters; electric drills; files; abrasives; saw blades; iron and steel for making cables; electrical distributing machinery; agricultural machinery; oxygen containers; oxygen-generating machines; gas masks; binoculars; industrial machinery.

In spite of the fact that these reports frequently include quantity figures, the frequent over-lapping of the time periods covered and, more important, the incompatibility of quantity designations (e.g. rounds, cases, or tons of ammunition) make it impossible to reconcile quantity figures or to arrive at a meaningful total. Moreover, in a few cases where cross-checking

of reported totals has been possible, the magnitude of the resultant discrepancy has cast further doubt upon the validity of the figures reported.

2. Imports from the USSR and other Soviet-bloc nations

No reliable information is available concerning direct trade between the Viet Minh and the USSR or other Soviet-bloc nations. Many of the items imported by the Viet Minh from China, however, are of Soviet or Soviet-bloc manufacture. We believe, therefore, that there is some trade either directly or indirectly and that such trade is of importance to the Viet Minh.

3. Supply routes

Although information concerning supply routes from Communist China to the Viet Minh is extensive, it is by no means conclusive. The most important supply routes apparently follow the natural invasion routes entering Indochina at Dong Dang or Te Lung along the Kwangsi border and proceeding to Langson (by railroad or truck) or to Cao Bang (by truck). Low grade reports indicate that, on the Kwangsi side, supplies reaching or originating in Nanning are sent to the border via Lungchow or Chingshi to Chennankuan and P'inghsiang. There is no reliable information concerning possible supply routes north and east of Nanning.

4. Economic capabilities of Communist China to supply the Viet Minh

Presently available information does not permit a quantitative estimate of Chinese Communist capability to supply the Viet Minh. It seems probable, however, that ultimate capability exceeds the present rate of assistance. Except perhaps for some categories of specialized military equipment, the rate of supply is apt to be determined primarily by policy decisions concerning the extent to which it is desirable to sustain the Viet Minh at the expense of civilian sectors of the Chinese economy and of Chinese military efforts elsewhere. The outcome of the Korean truce negotiations will, therefore, bear directly on the future capacity of Communist China to supply the Viet Minh, particularly with munitions.

B. What kind and quantity of supplies of major importance have been shipped to the Viet Minh by non-Bloc nations? Which routes are used primarily?

Because of the French blockade and the unavailability of exports from Viet Minh areas, it is unlikely that there is any substantial trade between

non-Communist bloc nations and the Viet Minh. No figures are available, however. There is probably a limited amount of trade between Viet Minh and Franco-Vietnamese-held areas in Vietnam, despite Government efforts to maintain a land and sea blockade. Individuals who have fled from Viet Minh territory have stated, without confirmation, that trusted workers' (Communist) Party members are designated in each sector to conduct trade with non-Communist regions, and such trade is supposed to be sufficiently lucrative to arouse envy among less favored individuals.

Although the total volume of such trade is probably not great, it may be of considerable importance to the Viet Minh because of specific shortages. Unconfirmed reports suggest that special efforts are made to secure medical supplies, fuel, and transportation equipment and parts.

There have also been reports of arms smuggling between Thailand and Viet Minh areas, carried on by coastwise shipping to Communist-held areas in Cochin-china and overland through Cambodia. No estimates have been made of the volume of this traffic.

C. Which Indochinese exports are of major importance to non-Bloc nations?

Principal Indochinese exports are rice, coal and rubber. Production of all these commodities has been drastically curtailed by destruction of equipment and transportation, by actual military operations, and in the case of rice, by Governmental restrictions on exports. Only rubber production has been restored to approximately its pre-war level. Reduction of acreage devoted to rice production in Vietnam has cut exports from a pre-war annual average in excess of one million tons to 300,000 tons in 1951. It is unlikely that 1952 exports will exceed 400,000 tons. Exports from Cambodia are banned at present, partly due to fears of shortage and partly to a nationalistic drive to develop local milling facilities to replace the practice of shipping paddy through the port of Saigon.

Even reduced exports of rice are vital, however, because of rice deficits in other Asian countries. Restoration of pre-war production levels would contribute importantly to improvement of the presently critical food supply for large areas of the Far East.

III. Stockpiles

What information is there regarding the kind, quantity, and location of stockpiles which might be employed in Indochina?

A. Stockpiles within Viet Minh territory

There are two types of supply dumps: those established on the border where the Viet Minh take delivery of the material and those established along the roads which run through the Viet Minh zone.

1. Depots established on the border are as follows: Thuy Cau (most important), Ai Khau, Dong Khe, Nam Quan, Phuc Hoa.

2. Depots established in the interior of the Viet Minh zone are as follows: Na Pac, Cao Ky, Choi Moi, Dang Minh, Giang Tien, Pho Ngu, Na Mieu, Dinh Ca, Na Mang, Tuyen Quang, Phy Tho, Thai Nguyen, and Yen Bay. The most important of these depots are those of Na Pac, Cao Ky and Dinh Ca. The Na Pac, Cao Ky, Tuyen Quang, Dinh Ca depots are reserved for the storing of armament. The Dang Minh and Na Mieu depots are reserved mostly for the storing of medical material. The Giang Tien and Dinh Ca depots are used mostly for quartermaster supplies. All of these depots (particularly Na Pac) also store gasoline.

The quantity of supplies in these various dumps is not known.

B. Stockpiles within South China

Information concerning the location of stockpiles in South China, and the quantities and types of material stored in this area, is, as a general rule, limited to low-grade reports of doubtful reliability. Furthermore, the information contained in such reports is extremely fragmentary. Even if the reports were taken at face value, they would provide insufficient information upon which to make an estimate either of the quantities of material stored in any given location or of the total inventories of material in the entire South China area or any other area of China.

The general tenor of the reports, however, indicates that military supplies are stored in warehouses and storage facilities in virtually all of the principal towns and cities along the South China rail net (Changsha, Hengyang, Kukong, Canton, Kweilin, Liuchou, Nanning, etc.) as well as in numerous river towns

such as Wuchou and Huiyang. A number of reports indicate that military supplies are stored in the Whampoa area, the Wanshan Islands, and Hainan Island. Most reports concerning Hainan are probably greatly exaggerated. In the China-Indochina border area, stockpiles and/or warehouses (including caves, temples, and private residences which have been converted into warehouses) have been reported in the Nengring, Langchou, Fangcheng, Yamchow, Chinghsi, and Kunming areas.

Apart from generalized statements that "military supplies" are stored in a particular area, the reports indicate that a wide variety of military items are stockpiled, including rifles, mortars, artillery pieces (including AA), ammunition, food, clothing, medical supplies, signal equipment, engineering equipment, POL, trucks, spare parts, explosives, and "strategic materials." There is insufficient information upon which to assess these categories with respect to quantity of a given category in any single location or the total quantity for the area as a whole.

IV. Manpower

A. What is the military manpower of the Viet Minh? What is the recruitment potential? What are the limiting factors -- equipment, trained cadres, other? What are the replacement policies of Viet Minh?

A recently released French study estimates that within their areas of control in Vietnam, the Viet Minh can draw on a population of 9,712,000. Of this number, 1,112,000 are males of military age (18-45) who are fit for combat. The study points out, however, that theoretical Viet Minh recruiting capabilities are actually of little importance, since the requirements for fighting troops; for administrative, communications, transport, and police services; and for procurement of food supplies indicate that the number of additional men available for the Viet Minh Army, above presently constituted forces, is really very slight. The Viet Minh has difficulty, furthermore, in exploiting all manpower not controlled by the French and Associated States particularly in remote and backward regions. On the other hand, the Viet Minh has been able to recruit some manpower located within the Red River Delta and in areas in Cochin-China which are surrounded by French Union Troops.

The Viet Minh has thus far revealed the capacity to replace combat casualties and other losses, although there are reports that the military manpower situation has recently deteriorated, both in terms of morale and availability of replacement. Although unconfirmed thus far, these reports suggest that increasing numbers of teenage youths are being drafted for military service, and that there have been relatively large-scale desertions from some units. The accuracy of these reports probably cannot be determined prior to the end of the summer rainy season, when fighting may be renewed on a scale larger than at present. Even if the Viet Minh is having difficulty meeting its manpower requirements, it is probable that its regular units will be reconstituted by the end of the 1952 rainy season.

It seems likely that the Communists will be able to maintain roughly the present degree of mobilization, in the absence of territorial gains by the Franco-Vietnamese forces, a reduction of supplies and technical assistance from the Chinese Communists, or some unforeseen development which severely reduced the food supplies available to the Viet Minh.

Increased mobilization, on the other hand, is inhibited by the necessity of maintaining existing levels of food and armaments production, by shortages of some types of military equipment, and by depletion of trained combat cadres in battle or through disease. It is probable that some types of technical training, particularly in artillery and communications, are being provided in China, and maintenance of the present degree of combat efficiency is probably dependent on continuance of these forms of assistance.

No information has been received concerning troop rotation and replacement policies of the Viet Minh.

B. What is the extent of Chinese Communist personnel assistance to the Viet Minh?

1. Chinese Communist technical "advisors" with the Viet Minh: the number, training, status, function and influence of these people.

2. Chinese Communist Military "volunteers" with the Viet Minh: the number, method of integration, command relationships, training, status, function and influence of these people.

It has been fairly well established that Chinese Communist personnel -- instructors, technicians, political and military advisers, and perhaps transport labor along major supply routes -- have been operating with the Viet Minh. Estimates on the extent of this personnel assistance, however, have varied widely. While the average of the several estimates in the past has been in the neighborhood of 10,000 to 15,000, there has been a gradual decrease during 1952, and the present strength estimate is roughly 5,000. This decrease was apparently attributable to the progress made by the Viet Minh in their organization, to the development of training camps in South China, and to the difficulties encountered in the presence of Chinese in Viet Minh zones. With respect to this latter point, it is felt that the Viet Minh, while not denying the necessity of Chinese Communist assistance, have been attempting to reduce the numbers of advisers and technicians in Viet Minh zones because of the possibility of a resurgence of traditional antipathy among the Indochinese for the Chinese.

There are no identified Chinese Communist combat units in Indochina except for some units which may temporarily cross the northern Tonkin border for local operations from time to time. There are in addition, various border tribesmen (probably from both sides of the border) in Viet Minh units.

There have been frequent references to a so-called "volunteer" force in South China organized to fight in Indochina if this should eventually become desirable. The specified mission, composition, organization and size of this force are not known.

The Viet Minh may, in fact, pursue a deliberate policy of restricting contacts between Chinese personnel and the Vietnamese population, in order to avoid arousing historic animosities held by most Vietnamese toward the Chinese. There are no confirmed reports of Chinese combat casualties, except for minor operations along the northern border. It appears, therefore, that Chinese Communist personnel operate primarily in conjunction with central administrative units and at higher command levels, and such a policy would definitely limit the capacity of the Viet Minh organization to absorb foreign specialists and advisers.

The precise nature of the relationship between Chinese Communist advisers and the Viet Minh personnel with whom they operate is unclear. There is no evidence to suggest that Pei-p'ing has forced the Viet Minh leadership into accepting personnel assistance, and the degree of direction or control exercised by these specialists is unknown.

It is probable that there are Chinese Communist agents operating within the Chinese community in Indochina, which is largely concentrated in the South Vietnam city of Cholon and its environs, and there have been numerous, unconfirmed, reports of special schools in China for training organizers and intelligence specialists for work in Indochina. Neither the number nor the functions of these specialists can be given.

C. To what extent are Viet Minh technicians, including airforce pilots and mechanics being trained by the Chinese Communists? What type and how many specialized units have the Chinese Communists trained?

The Chinese Communists are reported to be training Viet Minh drivers, mechanics, and personnel for the more specialized units such as artillery, signal corps, medical, and engineer. Most of this training is taking place in China. The number of units receiving this training is not known.

Since early 1950 the Viet Minh High Command has recruited specially qualified young men to take parachute, air mechanic, and flying courses. In 1950 it was claimed that they possessed about 10 American aircraft, single and twin-engine, with no qualified personnel to fly them. Since that time various reports have indicated Viet Minh pilot training at Chinese airfields in Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Kwangtung Provinces. A recent unsubstantiated report alleged that Soviet, Chinese Communist, and Viet Minh representatives had decided that the Viet Minh had enough air officers for the nucleus of an air force and that 250 aircraft would be subsequently transferred. A June 1952 report stated that 197 pilots from Indochina were sent to Pei-p'ing, enroute to the USSR for advanced pilot training.

In northern Vietnam are airstrips which could be used by a Viet Minh Air Force. These landing strips are not more than 3,600 feet long, but would be adequate for the Lavoch Kin, Yak, and PE-2. Viet Minh headquarters are at Thai Nguyen Airfield (21-37N, 105-50E), and installation with slight military potential. Langson Airfield (21-50N, 106-46E), the best field possessed by the Viet Minh, could be made serviceable for conventional-fighter and light-bomber operations in a maximum of seven days.

An air-training program for Viet Minh personnel is being undertaken by the Chinese Communists with advice and supervision from the Soviets. However, the French Air Force has, to date, received no air opposition from the Viet Minh.

V. Food

A. To what extent does Viet Minh meet its own food requirements? What are the principal items? The quantities?

There is no reliable information concerning the extent to which food production in Communist-controlled areas satisfies Viet Minh food requirements. Although certain inferences regarding the general agricultural situtation within Viet Minh-controlled areas can be drawn from numerous propaganda broadcasts outlining agricultural policy, the need for intensified production, and the importance of the rice tax, and from the fact that rice crops have become important military objectives, no quantitative data are available showing Viet Minh requirements and/or food production. It is probable, however, that the Viet Minh would be unable to meet its food requirements in the absence of its present ability to commandeer supplies in regions nominally held by Franco-Vietnamese forces.

Principal food items in the Viet Minh diet are assumed to be generally the

same as for Indochina as a whole, with rice and salt of primary importance. It is believed that items of secondary importance available to the Viet Minh include fish, manioc, sweet potatoes, soy beans and various other vegetables. Quantities are unknown.

B. What additional food resources would be available to the Viet Minh if it were to take all of Tonkin? All of Indochina?

If the Viet Minh were to take all of Tonkin the most important result in terms of food resources would be the acquisition of the rice-producing areas of the rich Red River Delta, the most productive in all of northern Vietnam. They would also gain control of important salt pans in the lower river delta. At present, however, North Vietnam is a rice-deficit area, so that seizure of all Tonkin would not, in the short run, solve the food problems of the Viet Minh. Current shipments from Cochin-China would presumably be cut off, and only extensive efforts to increase total production in the North would make the area self-sufficient in foodstuffs.

If the Viet Minh were to gain control of all Indochina, the Communists would not only solve their own food supply problems, but have a potential rice surplus which presumably would be exported to the Communist bloc. In addition to rice supplies, important corn-producing and cattle-raising areas in Cambodia would fall to the Viet Minh.

C. How does rice production and supplies affect Viet Minh military operations?

Communist military operations are frequently undertaken primarily for the purpose of securing rice supplies. Current Viet Minh operations within the Tonkin delta appear to be designed chiefly to seize harvested rice and to secure recruits. The timing of the harvest seasons apparently also effects Viet Minh military operations to some extent, and Communist propaganda broadcasts have suggested that troops are frequently used, at critical times, to harvest and transport rice. Recent Communist guerrilla activities in Cambodia have shown increasing concentration in rice-surplus areas.

D. To what extent are the Viet Minh forces dependent on food imports from Communist China and other Bloc nations? From non-Bloc nations?

There are reports of food imports from Communist China (see II,A), but no quantities are known. The total volume of supplies shipped from China is believed

to be sufficiently low, however, so that foodstuffs probably amount to little more than efforts to meet seasonal shortages in the least productive regions.

There is no information concerning possible food imports from other countries.

VI. Military Production Capacity

A. What are the principal areas in which Viet Minh military supplies are manufactured? What quantities and types of weapons and equipment are being produced by the Viet Minh?

The principal area of Viet Minh in which military supplies are being manufactured is Tonkin. There is considerable manufacture of small arms, including mortars and bazookas and also ammunition for these weapons, but no evidence of the manufacture of heavier weapons or their ammunition. The industry is very primitive and carried on in a number of small establishments with little equipment. Because of their small size, the establishments are highly mobile and can move to avoid capture. Inasmuch as shortages of equipment, raw materials and technical knowledge seriously restrict the capabilities of the industry, it does not meet the needs of the Viet Minh forces. Limited amounts of pistols, rifles, submachine guns, grenades and small arms ammunition are produced. Although these amounts are not sizable or sufficient, they supplement supplies from China and serve to meet temporary gaps in these supplies.

B. Are the Viet Minh developing Northern Annam into a strong economic and military base?

The development of north Annam into a strong economic base by the Viet Minh is considered unlikely. North Annam lacks the mineral resources for industry that are found in Tonkin. Also, the area would probably not be used as a large supply base as it is located too far from sources of supply on the Communist China-Indochina border. Because of poor transportation facilities, it would be difficult to transport material overland to north Annam. The movement of supplies by water from Hainan Island is difficult also because of the French naval blockade.

C. To what extent are they capable of meeting their own requirements while maintaining the present level of military activity?

The Viet Minh are not considered capable of meeting their own requirements at the present level of military activity. They have no resources for the manufacutre of heavy equipment or large caliber ammunition and can only partially support their requirements in small arms and ammunition.

VII. Political

A. What is the organizational structure of the Communist regime in the DRV; (b) the Lien Viet; and (c) the Workers Party? What is the state of morale among Viet Minh leadership, and among the population within Viet Minh-controlled territory; the extent of consolidation of control over territories held by the Viet Minh; the political, economic and police instruments of control; the extent to which the regime is welcomed and supported; the degree of power, if any, enjoyed by non-Communist Party leadership; the present role of Ho-Chi-Minh; the present role of other Viet Minh leaders; frictions, if any, existing between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists; the existence, if any, of Viet Minh "nationalist," as distinguished from "Communist" aspirations; the displacing, if any, of indigenous leadership and influence by Chinese pressure or personalities; the existence, if any, of frictions between Peiping and Moscow concerning superior influence over the DRV?

The Oranizational Structure of the Communist Regime

The "DRV". In general terms, the "DRV" appears to be evolving according to the pattern followed in other Communist satellites. The process of consolidating control and organizing governmental functions goes on despite the non-contiguity of Communist-held areas and the continuation of the war which has absorbed most of the available human and material resources of the region for almost seven years.

The Government proper, headed by "President" Ho Chi Minh, ostensibly functions through a cabinet which includes the usual ministries. Direction of the war effort is primarily in the hands of a Supreme Council of National Defense, which apparently exercises power over the civilian sectors of the economy as well as military plans and operations. The National Assembly, formed following the "elections" of January 1946, is not known to have functioned since. Government, therefore, is by decree of the Council of Ministers.

At lower levels, the principal governmental administrative organs are the Resistance and Administrative Committees, established in Viet Minh Interzones, provinces, and localities. These bodies presumably are organized in sections corresponding to particular government functions, but little is known concerning their actual structure and operation. In some instances, military commanders also occupy posts in the civil administration. The propaganda and indoctrination apparatus is organizationally headed by the Information Service, with a Director of cabinet rank. The judicial system appears to be developing into a system of "people's tribunals," which has resulted in the displacement of French magistrates by officials who reach decisions on the basis of the political objectives of the regime.

At the present time, the "DRV" constitution is reportedly being revised, with the declared objective of removing the remnants of "bourgeois parliamentarianism."

The Lien Viet and The Workers' Party. The Lien Viet, or National United Front, is an amalgamation of political parties and mass organizations. It includes the Workers' (Communist) Party which, in fact, dominates its activities, and the Democratic and Socialist Parties which are apparently designed to secure the support of non-Communist intellectuals for the "DRV" program. In addition, "Front" groups representing occupational, cultural, and religious groups are affiliated with the Lien Viet, and serve as a device for recruiting widespread participation in activities that are sanctioned by the leadership which, ultimately, is the Communist Party.

Headed by an Executive Committee composed of representatives of the constituent organizations, the Lien Viet is organized at interzone, provincial, and local levels paralleling the government structure. Apparently, the Lien Viet committee at any particular level is supposed to coordinate its activities with the programs of the corresponding Resistance and Administrative Committee, in addition to being responsible for carrying out special tasks assigned by the Executive Committee of the Lien Viet.

Workers' (Communist) Party. The Workers' Party declares itself to be the "leading element in the national struggle for independence," and is acknowledged to be the source of ultimate guidance by all administrative and "front" group organizations. It is therefore, as in other Communist states, the key to the actual operation of the entire governmental structure. Control is maintained primarily by placing Party members in key positions in all governmental and mass organization units. In the cabinet, for example, some ministers are non-Party people, but in all these cases it appears that the vice-minister is a Party member. Party members are charged with seizing "leading roles" in all organizations to which they belong.

Reported figures for Party membership vary so widely that no adequate estimate is possible, nor is it known whether membership is increasing. The Party apparently penetrates the military services by a system of political commissars (in some instances the military commander serves in both capacities), but the ratio of Party members to total troop strength has not been established. The precise membership of the Tongbo, or Politburo, is uncertain.

Viet Minh Morale and Internal Controls

In their public utterances, Viet Minh leaders radiate confidence, although no effort is made to disguise their belief that a protracted struggle, involving many hardships, will be necessary before the "completion of the revolution" will be achieved. The ability of the Viet Minh to hold off the forces of a major world power for almost seven years, and the consolidation of Communist control in a powerful neighbor to the North, must lend encouragement to the leadership. Although the leaders' current estimates of capabilities and prospects cannot be surmised, there is no evidence that doubts, if any, have been communicated to the population at large.

The existence of discontent among some segments of the population in Communist-controlled areas is revealed by continuing defections and by the constant stream of Viet Minh propaganda attempting to justify and explain the hardships which must be endured during the present stage of the struggle. There are some indications that intellectuals, as a group, are among the most disillusioned and frustrated elements in the population -- presumable because they better understand the implications of Communist control of the Viet Minh movement and because their position in society is jeopardized by the necessity for conforming to Party structures. Popular dissatisfaction attributable to repressive controls may be increased by awareness that economic conditions are generally better in free areas than in the Viet Minh zones.

Consolidation of Communist control has proceeded despite some discontent. There have been no effective uprisings in areas firmly held by the Viet Minh. It is clear that the Communists rely on a combination of coercion and persuasion to maintain loyalty, or at least effective control, but the extent of voluntary

cooperation is not clear. Political controls involve the sanctions imposed by operation of the standard Communist system of public denunciation, confession, and "guided" re-dedication, augmented by Party penetration of all organizations and by police controls. It is not known just what role the Viet Minh military arm plays in the maintenance of internal order. Economic controls seem to be relatively effective as they relate to the organization of production for war purposes and the collection of taxes from the population, although it is apparent that there has been considerable resistance to the method of collecting taxes in kind and to the magnitude of the levies. In fringe areas, which are often controlled by French forces by day and by the Viet Minh at night, Communist exactions represent double taxation, which is undoubtedly resented but often complied with as a form of protection.

There are clearly many Vietnamese who still believe that the Viet Minh represents the true nationalist force in Indochina, and who therefore support the regime despite possible dissatisfaction with the deprivations which the war demands. The longer effective Viet Minh occupation of large areas continues, the more successful will be the Communist program of indoctrination and re-education. These efforts are being directed primarily at youth, and it appears, that, in general, the most enthusiastic support for the Viet Minh comes from younger elements in the population.

Intra-Elite Relationships of the Regime

Non-Communist elements within the leadership of the Viet Minh appear to exercise very little effective power. The Democratic and Socialist Parties have been maintained, apparently to preserve the appearance of an opportunity for non-Communist political activity, but in fact the programs of these parties coincide completely with the official "Line" of the Viet Minh. The extent to which this support and cooperation is voluntary cannot be ascertained. Non-Party officials appear to be effectively controlled by their Communist associates.

The present status of Ho Chi Minh is not definitely known. He has been variously reported, within the past year, as dead, in failing health, quite robust, still in effective leadership of the movement, reduced to figurehead status behind the Stalinist Truong Chinh (Secretary General of the Workers' Party), on trips to China and Moscow, and still at Viet Minh headquarters in North Vietnam. The various reports cannot be evaluated.

It is clear, however, that Ho remains the symbol of the "resistance," kept before the population as a figure to be revered and emulated. There are no present indications that the prospect of a change in leadership, or its actuality, has brought about significant changes in the course of the revolution or its ultimate objectives.

Apart from Ho Chi Minh, the outstanding Viet Minh leaders include: Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; Pham Van Dong, Vice-Premier; Truong Chinh, Secretary General of the Workers' Party; Hoang Quoc Viet, Chairman of the General Federation of Labor; and Ton Duc Thang, President of the Lien Viet Front and of the National Assembly. The nature of the relationships among these top leaders is not well known, nor has it been ascertained whether there are individuals of less public prominence who occupy equivalent positions in terms of actual power.

External Relations of the Viet Minh

Viet Minh relationships with Communist China characterized by acknowledgment of China's "leading role" in the Asian Communist movement and of the value of Chinese experience as the prototype of successful revolution in "colonial" lands. No conclusive evidence of frictions between Chinese Communist and Viet Minh leadership has come to light. It has been reported that some Viet Minh leaders oppose Chinese intervention and support for the struggle in Indochina, but it is not known whether such a viewpoint, if it exists, reflects antagonism toward the Chinese Communist leadership or sensitivity to general Vietnamese animosity toward China, particularly in the form of a fear of revived Chinese imperialism.

It is quite certain that "nationalist" aspirations continue to motivate large numbers of supporters of the Viet Minh regime, whose fundamental desire is an end to French political influence in Indochina. The Viet Minh leadership, however,

appears to have accepted ultimate Stalinist goals and methods, although realization of these goals dictates the achievement of national unity and "independence" as a first step. Efforts to create public awareness and acceptance of Soviet and Chinese leadership appear to be increasing, although primary emphasis continues to be placed on the domestic situation and the tasks which it imposes.

The extent to which acceptance of Chinese Communist political, military, and technical advisors has meant a reduction in the Viet Minh leadership's power of decision is unknown. Since Viet Minh and Chinese Communist objectives vis-a-vis Indochina appear to coincide at the present time, it is possible that present relationships are genuinely cooperative and represent voluntary acceptance of advice by the Viet Minh.

No friction between Moscow and Pei-p'ing over primacy of influence over the "DRV" has come to light. When a "DRV" ambassador to Moscow was appointed in the spring of 1952, it was suggested in some reports that the step indicated Soviet fears lest Chinese influence become predominant. It appears, however, that establishment of the mission was a normal development which surprisingly had been delayed two years after Soviet "recognition" of the "DRV" and the opening of a "DRV" mission in Pei-p'ing in 1950. The Viet Minh acknowledges its ultimate loyalty to the Soviet Union and to Stalin, while emphasizing the "special position" which Communist China occupies in relation to the Asian Communist movement.

B. What is the net economic drain of Indochina on France? What is the total fiscal burden of its Indochina policy on the French government? What part of the cost of maintaining the Franco-Vietnamese position is borne by the government of Vietnam?

Because of the absence of adequate statistical material, particularly for the Associated States, it is not possible, at present, to assess the net economic drain on France or the Associated States resulting from the present war effort in Indochina. The principal gaps include figures for the National Budget of Vietnam, actual French expenditures in Indochina, and the precise current balance of payments position of the Associated States.

The direct financial cost of maintaining the Franco-Vietnamese position, reflected in military appropriations, can be approximated, but the magnitude of several conditioning elements is unknown. These factors include:

1. War-caused destruction of economic wealth in Indochina;

2. The consequences of diverting manpower and goods to war purposes;

3. The loss, to both France and Indochina, which results from the drastic curtailment of rice exports attributable to the war;

4. The ultimate economic impact of French local procurement in the Associated States;

5. Civilian and military remittances to France;

6. Profits of French commercial enterprises in Indochina which, reportedly, are being withdrawn at an increasing rate.

In terms of direct financial cost, the French military budget for 1952 allocates 470 billion francs ($1,340 million) for the military effort in Indochina. (The conversion rates used are 20 piastres to the dollar, 17 piastres to the franc, and 350 francs to the dollar. The piastre is generally believed to be overvalued in relation to the dollar.) This figure reportedly includes 331 billion francs for French ground forces, 71 billion francs for air and navy, and 68 billion francs as subsidy for the National Armies of the Associated States. The civil budget of the High Commissariat for FY 1951 amounted to approximately 8 billion francs.

As long as the principal theaters of war are in Vietnam, the defense appropriations of Laos and Cambodia represent very small fractions of the total financial cost. The Vietnamese contribution can only be approximated. According to a Franco-Vietnamese agreement, the Government of Vietnam is supposed to allocate 40% of its revenues for defense purposes. It is believed that, in 1951, this figure represented a commitment of about 770 million piastres (13.1 billion francs). In addition, some fraction of the Vietnamese civil budget (totaling approximately 1,450 million piastres in 1951) represented military-support expenditures -- for propaganda, administration of newly pacified areas, etc. No official 1952 figures have been made available. There are some indications, however, that the Vietnamese military budget, including the French contribution, will total about 5,800 million

piastres (93.6 billion francs), and French estimates suggest that Vietnamese appropriations are expected to rise to roughly 1,235 million piastres (21 billion francs). Vietnamese appropriations for propaganda and pacification work are probably also increasing.

These figures, which are only approximate, suggest a Vietnamese contribution to the maintenance of the Franco-Vietnamese position in the neighborhood of 75 million, in contrast with a French financial commitment of something less than US $1,340 million and American military and economic assistance which may reach $450 million. The indicated figure of 45-55 as the Vietnamese contribution to the total direct financial cost takes no account of the fact that the war is being fought on Vietnamese soil, with the attendant economic destruction and dislocation.

C. What is the nature of Vietnamese political activity in France, Hong Kong, and Great Britain? Who are the principal personalities engaged in such activity?

1. Vietnamese political activity in France

Vietnam is at present officially represented in France by a High Commissioner, Prince Buu Loc, and his staff. Because of the peculiar situation created by the hostilities in Vietnam and the still "evolutionary" character of diplomatic representation within the French Union, the function of this delegation vis-a-vis the French Government has seemed in the past to be more in the field of protocol than of political affairs. No information has been received concerning the relationship, if any, between this delegation and Vietnamese residents and overseas organization in France.

(a) Groupement Permanent des Etudiantes Vietnamiennes--a women's organization reportedly founded in January or February 1952;

(b) General Assembly of the Cong-Nhan-workers' group;

(c) Hoi du Hoc Sinh Viet-Nam--a students' organization in Paris;

(d) Republican Club--said to have been formed in November 1951 under the leadership of General Xuan.

There is no information concerning the membership, political sentiments, policies, or activities of these groups.

2. Viet Minh political activity in France

It has been reported that earlier Viet Minh organizations in France which were banned after French recognition of Bao Dai continue to exist in the form of an "Association des Vietnamiens residents en France." The president of this organization is alleged to be Do Dai Phuoc and the secretary, General Huynh Trong Dong. This report has never been confirmed and there is no information concerning the activity of this or other Viet Minh groups in France.

3. Vietnamese political activity in Hong Kong

No information is available concerning Vietnamese political activity in Hong Kong.

4. Vietnamese political activity in Great Britain

(a) Government of Vietnam

Vietnam is represented in Great Britain by its accredited Minister, Nguyen Khac Ve. No information has been received concerning the activities of the mission however.

(b) Viet Minh

In mid-1951 the following Viet Minh organizations were reported to be functioning in Great Britain:

(1) Union of Vietnamese Students under the leadership of Ton That Thien and Nguyen My Dien;

(2) Overseas Lien Viet headed by Vu Van Que and Nguyen Van Tac.

No recent information has been received concerning Viet Minh organizations in Great Britain and nothing is known about the political activity of Viet Minh supporters there.